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Evil angels and forensic scientists : representations of law in popular culture 
Abstract 
Professor Chase (1986: 527) suggests law would benefit if it recognised and gave serious study to 'the 
impact of legal ideas conveyed through the' institutions of popular culture'. In responding to his challenge 
I intend to address just one aspect of law's representation in popular culture, the law/science nexus 
through its manifestation as forensic science. That area relates directly to the role and status of these 
intersecting discourses, and raises the question of whether the hierarchy of discourses which gives 
natural precedence to science adversely affects law. In other words, is justice a casualty in these 
encounters? In examining this proposition, I have selected two texts with contrasting representations of 
science's role in law. 




REPRESENTATIONS OF LAW IN
POPULAR CULTURE
Virginia Rival/and
Professor Chase (1986: 527) suggests law would benefit if itrecognised and gave serious study to 'the impact of legal ideasconveyed through the' institutions of popular culture'. In
responding to his challenge I intend to address just one aspect of law's
representation in popular qdture, the law/science nexus through its
manifestation as forensic science. That area relates directly to the role and
status of these intersecting discourses, and raises the question of whether the
hierarchy of discourses which gives natural precedence to science adversely
affects law. In other words, is justice a casualty in these encounters? In
examining this proposition, I have selected two texts with contrasting
representations of science's role in law.
INSTITUTIONAL INTERACTIONS
Institutions commonly attempt to emulate or align themselves with
science, as a way of increasing their status. The scientific paradigm, with its
much vaunted scientific methodology, 'guarantees' rationality, objectivity,
and infallibility. Mfl.liation with science is an attractive proposition because
it offers status, ready acceptance and little procedural scrutiny. Law has
points of comparison with science, although as Smart (1991: 9) notes, it does
not call itself a science because 'it does not have to':
Denning a field of knowledge as science is to claim that it
speaks a truth which can be favourably compared to partial
truths and untruths which epitomise non-scientific
discourse ... I am not saying that law attempts to call itself
a science, but then it does not have to. Law has its own
metbod, its own testing ground, its own specialised
language and system of results.
Smart draws attention to the institutional structures and discursive
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practices that construct law as an institution and naturalise its so-called legal
method, as its way of ordering procedures, labelling events and categorising
objects and people. For example, law employs wbat Cousins (1988: 131)
describes as a 'jealously guarded order of procedure', which is the process
by which legal argument is conducted via a set of rules designed to exclude
and include particular kinds of information according to predetermined
principles: 'There are definite rules of evidence concerning admissibility.
Hearsay may be discounted: clearly motivated witnesses may be impugned'
(Cousins 1988: 132). The truth that is arrived at, as a result of this process,
is a particular kind of truth, 'a strictly legal truth' (1988: 133).
Law too, via its appeal process, shares some of science's ability to
incorporate failure into its methodology without it reflecting adversely on
itself or its processes. Science's 'perfect' fail-safe mechanism, stems from its
positivist discourse of continuous experimentation with its notion of
'falsifiability' (Popper 1974: 36). This has, as a fundamental requirement, the
necessity to attempt to disprove a given hypothesis, and thus incorporates
failure into its very experimental method but assiduously avoids naming it as
such. In a similar way, law can incorporate 'judicial failure', and even the
odd 'miscarriage of justice', without inviting scrutiny of the system itself.
The fact that one legal process using the accepted judicial method can arrive
at a (presumed) correct decision, which is subsequently overturned by a
higher court. is not viewed as a fault of the system. Just the opposite in fact.
Paradoxically it is seen as proof that the system works, and works well.
Bourke (1993: 12?-) in her critique of the Chamberlain case, notes just
such a contradiction: 'CT)he notoriety of Chamberlain has only served to
distinguish it from other cases, so that it is now commonly thought of as an
aberration, a 'one-off' legal mistake'. Bourke herself sees it as part of a much
larger problem which relates to the unreliability of forensic or scientific
evidence. Nevertheles~, some aspects of law continue to attempt to align
themselves closely with the scientific paradigm. Criminology, for example,
is based on the scientific model of cause/effect with its notions of
inevitability and predictability. The continuing debate on law and order
indicates there has been little success in either predicting or in controlling
crime. Another area where the two discourses intersect, is in forensic or
scientific evidence. Significantly, representations of this kind form the basis




As a general rule, fictionalised forensic examples are characterised by an
adherence to the positivist scientific line. They are underwritten by the
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notion that when enough facts are obtained by the specialist scientist the
answer/truth becomes clear and inevitable. The ABC series Phoenzx
exemplifies this model. In this cop series, science is treated reverentially
with tacit affIrmation of its infallible status. By association it invests
credibility in the institution it supports - the judicial system.
Phoenix, as part of the cop genre series, advertises itself as ret1ecting the
'real' world. It is heavily naturalistic in narrative detail, setting and dialogue.
Its concerns centre on the serious masculine business of public life as
dangerous, competitive and unpredictable. The forensic husband and wife
team, Ian and Carol Cochrane, appear at various times throughout the series.
They assist the police in collecting evidence at crime sites, providing
hypotheses based on the evidence and submitting the evidence to various
testing procedures. When shown in the work environment, the pair are
usually portrayed in white lab coats surrounded by scientific apparatus. The
characterisation of the senior scientist, Ian Cochrane, draws heavily on the
stereotype of the 'crazy scientist', but any deliberate peculiarities, for
example odd socks, remain at the insignificant level to ensure that his
scientific judgement remains sacrosanct. Carol Cochrane, on the other hand,
is portrayed as something of a .feminist. A working mother, she stands
somewhat apart from the overtly masculine culture of crude jokes, sexual
innuendo, pubs and excessive drinking which characterise the police team.
Her character also reveals evidence of intellectual superiority, with wit 3Ild
repartee being her usual response in most situations.
Consider the forensic element in a typical scene from the second series,
shown on ABC on 27/5/93 - The extract invalves the scientist, Ian Cochrane,
testing the shoes of two detectives, to ascertain whether they were
responsible for a young girl's precipitous leap from an upstairs window
during an arrest. The young girl bas been left paralysed, and the odd5 are
stacked against the detectives being able to prove their innocence. In a
previous episode, via omniscient positioning, the viewer has been privy to
the 'truth' of the situation and knows the detectives are innocent. In this
\
scene, as the 4etectives hand their shoes over to Ian Cochrane for testing, he
remarks that if they are not the right ones it will go in his report. The purpose
of this seemingly unprovoked conunent becomes apparent in the exchange
which follows. It aims to establish scientific objectivity.
(Ian) 'Jock suggested I take extra care in case I'm biased
toward you. I mean what does he think I am ... 1' (Carol-
humorous aside) 'Human?'
(Ian) 'If you were my own mother, God help you~ I'd do
exactly the same as I always do'.
(Carol-smile and laugh) 'With careful incompetence' .
(Ian-good hUffiouredly) 'Will you shut up'.
136
Law/Text/Culture
The focus of this extract is clearly to pre-empt concerns of bias against
the scientist Ian Cochrane. It is framed as a personal issue but at stake is the
more general one of science's credibility. Such a pre-emptive tactic
represents, in media terms, a classic strategy of containment. By overtly
raising the issue of bias, the episode acknowledges, and at the same time
counters, possible viewer concern about Ian's 'objectivity' in the face of a
known friendship between himself and the detectives. Left unresolved the
issue might just lead to a more general query about science itself and
undermine science's validating role in the series. Within the verbal discourse,
Ian Cochrane explicitly denies subjective involvement 'I'd do the same if
you were my mother', implying that it is science's own methodology which
guarantees his impartiality. The narrative also signals that the truth will out,
in that the results of the tests will vindicate the detectives, because science
has been constructed as the method of deriving truth from the facts and
experimental procedure. In this instance science provides the answer via a
process Ian Cochrane calls 'analysing the footprint choreography'.
The actuality of this extraordinary procedure is demonstrated later in the
episode when a map, with various footprints on a transparency, are used to
explain the process to the detectives. Cochrane obtained the results by, in his
words, 'staring through a polylight and squaring it with an electrostatic
lifter'. These 'dance maps', with their dots and crosses, provide conclusive
proof that neither detective was involved in the girl's jump from the window.
In this short scene the verbal and visual discourses coalesce to produce an
unambiguous pro-science discourse. This dominant discourse is produced by
merging a script, heavy with scientificity, with visual images of tIle
laboratory, wbite coats, scientific paraphernalia and glasses for Ian
Cochrane. The synchronisation of the image, 'the dance map', with the
verbal explanation given by the scientist, 'makes it appear as if the images
speakfor themselves' (Brunsdon & Morley 1978: 62), and require no further
interpretation. The discourse is given additional weight by the process of
inscribing the viewer into the film space (Brunsdon & Morley 1978: 64).
Seeing the dance map through the eyes of the scientist, Ian Cochrane, in
a close-up displaying the graphics and detectives names, vouches for the
truth and validity of the material. This combination of processes reinforces
science's image as an infallible, objective and value-free knowledge system.
The scene's closure, which is signalled by a shift of focus to a wide shot
includes a reinforcing verbal summation, 'this means you're in the clear'.
The explanatory comment is offered by the female scientist, Carol Cochrane,
indicating perhaps that the feminine is required to decode the language of
men's science for the general audience.
This sequence's positive and incontrovertible outcome stands in marked
contrast to what happens in the rest of the narrative. Elsewhere things are
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seen to go horribly wrong for the police team: drug busts fail, information
goes astray, informers get killed, and factional rivalry within the team
eventually undermines the success of the operation. Within this maelstrom,
science remains intact and inviolate and, by association, gives credence to
the judicial institution it supports. The discourse of science being
propounded here is a wholly traditional one which refuses to acknowledge
either the possibility of scientific error or of ambiguity.
On Bourke's (1993: 124-125) evidence, law perpetuates this discourse
when it fails to recognise: 'the existence of unreliable scientific test
evidence: its extent across a whole range of scientific tests ... and the lack of
awareness of the problem by lawyers'. The associated tendency of lawyers
to regard failures of the judicial system based on forensic evidence, as mere
'aberration[s]' (Bourke: 127) has also been criticised. Wilson's (1991: 4)
analysis of ten miscarriage of justice cases, for example, identified 'expert
evidence' as a major problem in six, of the cases examined. In the
Chamberlain case alone, he lists six separate problem areas, three of these
revolve around the. 'evidence', with queries about its 'partial',
'circumstantial' and/or 'inconclusive nature.
Wilson's examples seem to suggest a less than perfect 'fit' or
accommodation, between the intersecting discourses of science and law.
How far do these aberrant legal outcomes result from the hierarchy of
discourses which gives natural precedence to science? Does the discourse of
science with its attendant claims of logic, objectivity and infallibility tend to
overwhelm or inhibit the legal discourse and its processes, and if this is the
case, what is the result?
Some support for this claim can be found in the special provisions
allowed expert witnesses in respect of giving testimony. Normal rules of
evidence exclude hearsay, but this provision is waived for expert witnesses
called to testify on the basis of their possessing special knowledge. A further
exemption app~ies too witb regard to offering opinions. A relaxation of the
normal procedural requirement which permits witnesses to report only on
observed facts allows experts to extrapolate, hypothesize, infer, and make
suggestions based on opinion rather than actual observation of an event. In
respect of the social sciences, Konopka (1980: 132) asserts that under normal
circumstances 'most of the sources of information from which a social
scientist derives an opinion would be inadmissible as evidence'. He includes
all data derived from census and survey results in this category.
Also regarded as problematic is the traditional attitude of deference to,
and regard for, the role of the expert. Science's privileged position in
Western society guarantees its members high credibility in respect of matters
relating to rationality, objectivity and value-free judgements. All these
characteristics are highly valued and sought after by the law in its
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administration of justice. Expert pronouncements are afforded special status
through what Cassidy (1991: 64) tenus 'author invisibility', which gives
subjective opinions the appearance of objective statements of fact. Bourke
(1993: 126) notes in her study that an 'aura of scientific certainty causes
lawyers and jurors to operate under a shroud of assumed omnipotence of
science'. Post (1980: 174) similarly comments on the 'opaque' nature of
evidence which is unwittingly caught up in the social prestige of the expert.
Within this system, science also constructs its own hierarchy which
authorises experts according to a set of criteria determined by the institution.
This hierarchy of expertise operates to discount other less credentialled
opinions and/or to disqualify non-scientific discourses. In the Chamberlain
trial, where specialist forensic scientists were an integral part of both the
prosecution and defence cases, special emphasis was placed on academic
and other qualifications as a way of establishing a clear superiority in the
scientific hierarchy. For example Professor Cameron, whose evidence of a
bloodstained handprint on the jumpsuit led to the re-opening of the case, is
regarded as, 'one of the leading forensic experts in the world' (Johnson 1984:
95). In court, his pre-eminence in the forensic field is evidenced by a list of
his previous accomplishments: 'So long was his curriculum vitae that
Sturgess handed a typed copy to Galvin, rather than read it all out' (Bryson
1989: 306).
In the retrospective decision that finally cleared the Chamberlains,
Justice Morling, using legal determinants, concluded that it was the Crown's
eminent forensic scientists who had made errors of judgement in their expert
evidence (Young 1989: 272). Young's review of the findings of the Morling
Inquiry also points to some fundamental flaws in science's revered
'objective' methodology:
Bias appears to have been a factor influencing the direction
of the errors ... Prejudice apparently blurred the vision of
scientific objectivity. Too many forensic experts simply
failed to practise a basic principle of modem science: to
subject all opinions to tests that are designed, if possible, to
invalidate them. (Young 1989: 272)
By contrast, the forensic work of the defence's less well credentialled
scientists was totally vindicated: 'Incredibly the Marling inquiry was a
triumph for these minor scientists over those with vastly superior reputations
in the forensic field' (Young 1989: 273). (emphasis added).
These examples are illustrative of how the discourse of science, in
addition to having special status within the legal system, also maintains its
own hierarchy of expertise which is but one of several factors that can atlect
a judicial outcome.
The adversariaI system is also seen as problematic in respect of forensic
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evidence. Any real notion of impartiality on the part of the expen is
destroyed, according to Hogg (1991: 193), by an adversarial process which
incorporates the so-called independent expert witness into ~the partisan
outlook of one or other of the adversaries' .
INSTITUTIONAL INTERROGATIONS: THE
CASE OF 'EVIL ANGELS'.
In setting out the various contentious points surrounding the sciencellaw
nexus it is clear that these sites of contestation otter ample opportunity for
law to be interrogated via science. A fibn text such as Evil Angels is useful
in how it interrogates many of these sites and in the process exposes the
nature and variety of discourses which support both law and science. These
range from a critique of science's sexist discourse, to an expose of the
institutionalised practices which empower the expert and discount
alternative discourses through exclusion of the non-expert.
Based on Bryson's (1985) novel Evil Angels, the film adopts a similar
pro-Chamberlain position and approaches the forensic evidence from that
partisan viewpoint. The film's ideological strategy clearly works to erode the
credibility of the forensic evidence. In its systematic undermining of the
law/science nexus, Evil Angels represents a rare media/legal instance of
discursive discrediting. The representation of forensic evidence occurs
primarily in the trial sequence with a variety of discrediting strategies being
utilised. The frrst forensic scientist presented is biologist, Joy Kuhlt whose
evidence of blood in the car, and particularly her assertion that foetal blood
was present, was vital to the Crown's case: 'The fact that Kuhl's evidence
dominated the proceedings in the second inquestt the trial t both appeals, and
the inquiry demonstrated the fundamental importance of her testimony'
(Young 1989: 182).
Kuhl is cast as a slightly frumpish, self-satisfied woman who bears more
than a passing resemblance to the accused, Lindy Chamberlain. Lindy
acknowledges 't!Jis visual similarity: 'the outfit, the polkadot dress,
practically the same as mine, not to mention the hairdo'. After hearing
KOOl's testimony, Lindy is seen to react to her personally: 'fluttering her eyes
at the jury', and adds rather crudely: '1 reckon she's got something going with
that copper too',
Lindy's role as the victim gives her vituperative comments narrative
motivation. By contrast, Kuhrs demeanour and language suggest a
subjective, personal investment in her evidence which severely detracts from
her objective standing as a scientist. For example under questioning she
stresses the subjective in describing the tests she carried out: 'The buckle
gave.111f. very, very strong positive reactions to blood' and 'the spray pattern
under the dash gave ll1.f. a very strong positive reaction to foetal
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haemoglobin'. Both the visual and verbal discourses here work to position
the spectator as observers to Kuhl's partiality in her close physical
attachment to her evidence. Subjectivity as opposed to objectivity is
constructed in her actual holding of the camera bag as she gives her
evidence. Under cross-examination Kuhl's credibility is further weakened
when she admits, with obvious discomfort, that the actual test-plates used in
the experiments have been destroyed. A combination of sound effects, an
audible gasp in the courtroom, and camera work, a closeup of the jury
showing surprised faces, frames the scene to Kuhl's disadvantage. In her
subsequent appearance in a hotel beer-garden in the company of the
prosecuting police, the film clinches Kuhl's lack of credibility as a
scientist/witness. In this scene Kuhlls speech reveals a personal antipathy
toward Lindy based on the most irrational of reasons, emotion coupled with
claims of black magic and sorcery: 'She just stared into my back. I couldfeel
it. She just stares you know. She's a witch you know!'. Although such a
suggestion in this context is seen as quite bizarre, the script here overtly
draws attention to an extra textual discourse circulating at the time; 'The
spectre of Lindy as witch was rarely articulated, yet the notion percolated
just beneath, constantly informing the imagery which pervaded the
discussion' ( Johnson 1984: 91).
In this segment involving Kuhl, scientific credibility is undermined by
activating a sexist rhetoric which postulates the discourse of woman as
scientist as antithetical (Haraway 1989). Both the verbal and visual
discourses systematically corrupt the 'aura of the expert', cuhninating in
Kuhl's absurdly anti-scientific reference to Lindy as a 'witch'. Indeed the
composite portrayal of both women in this sequence could be categorised as
sexist, as it reinforces stereotypical notions of women's behaviour.
Displayed are instances of gossip, petty jealousies, and judgements based on
superficialities and irrationality. With Lindy such strategies may work to
humanise and round out her character. but with Kuhl they are clearly
designed to discredit her as a person with any scientific credibility.
A combined attack on Kuhl, via her gender and psychological make-up,
counteracts her potential as a scientific witness. A similar technique
undermines another important expert witness, Professor Cameron, but
significantly it is not done on the basis of his gender. Cameron is shown to
have a character defect, a personal and professional arrogance which makes
him vulnerable as an expert witness. In his appearances another process is
employed which discredits the forensic evidence by setting up obvious
discrepancies between the visual and verbal discourses. The initial framing
of Cameron as the traditional expert is conveyed by technical and
representational codes including casting, dress codes and speech patterns.
(Fiske 1988). Camera shots from below construct Cameron's aquiline profile
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as arrogant while his cultivated and deliberate speech patterns activate a
discourse of superiority based on class with colonialist overtones. Cameron's
theatricalities, his staging for effect, in his suggestion of human involvement:
'There is evidence to suggest an incisal wound around the neck... in other
words...a cut throat!', is accentuated by a deliberate closeup of his face
which characteristically reveals emotion, whereas 'true' objectivity would
necessitate a mid-shot. The actual discrepancy between verbal and visual
discourses occurs when Professor Cameron attempts to demonstrate, via
'ultra violet photography', the presence of a handprint on the jumpsuit. The
visual discourse records a murky, indistinct, ambiguous image which is at
variance with Cameron's confident assertion of 'the impression of the hand
of a small adult'. In such a hierarchy of discourses the visual tends to take
precedence and the cut away shot to a female journalist adds verbal support
with the comment, 'If that's a hand I'm a virgin'. The spectator is here
positioned to favour the commonsense view over the expert scientific
opinion, whereas in the Phoenix example, the perfectly coinciding visual
images draw the spectator into an easy acceptance of science's 'truth'.
The framing of. the final sequence has the verbal discourse take
precedence, as Cameron's credentials as an expert are queried through
Lindy's conunents on his faulty evidence in the celebrated 'Confail case'.
During the cross-examination both verbal and visual discourses combine to
discredit Cameron. This reaches a high point in the concluding scene,
purporting to be television news footage, when in a grainy media shot with
voice-over, the verbal discourse indicates that Cameron's evidence has been
'completely discredited'. The high modality and truth status of news invests
this scene with credibility, and signals that Professor Cameron's fall from
grace is complete.
EXCLUDED KNOWLEDGES
While it is the hierarchical nature of institutional knowledge cultures
such as science which gives experts their status and credibility, the same
system operates to disempower, through exclusion, those whose skills and
knowledge are outside the paradigm. McHoul and Grace (1993: 15-16) refer
to these as: 'naive knowledges, because they are located low down on most
official hierarchies of ideas (Foucault 1980a :82). Certainly they are ranked
beneath science'. A clear illustration of this process occurs, when the text
conunents on the exclusion from the trial of different kinds of 'experts', the
Aboriginal trackers. According to Young (1989: 265): 'The blacktrackers
had no doubt that the tracks proved a dingo had seized Azaria from the
Chamberlain's tent', but the authorities continued to regard this information
as 'unreliable'.
In the fibn a sequence involving talk-back radio is used to demonstrate
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how Aboriginal cultural superiority in this sphere, is not acknowledged,
validated nor respected. When a female radio announcer queries on-air why
none of the trackers have been called to give evidence, an aggressive male
caller offers the standard racist response: 'Look lady, you can't believe those
bludgers. They're always drunk. You know that!'. In addition to its obvious
racist implications, this short sequence graphically illustrates tile unequal
struggle different discourses have to command assent. On display are the
methods customarily employed to discredit and inhibit non-credentialled
discourses on the basis of their lack of a 'scientificity'. Graycar and Morgan
(1990: 265), in summarising Howe's (1989) view on the media's role in the
Chamberlain case, conclude that:
the scientific evidence completely displaced the eyewitness
accounts and in particular, the evidence of an Aboriginal
tracker ... Howe suggests that the media's failure to report
the evidence of blacktrackers was also 'profoundly racist' .
(emphasis added)
Another technique by which the film disrupts science's ('iedibility occurs
when science is represented as a highly specialised and complex discourse.
The resulting level of incomprehensibility relates to what Cassidy (1991: 63)
refers to as the exclusivity or 'closed shop' which characterises each
discipline. In several instances, science's 'foreign' language is targetted for
ridicule because of its elitism and lack of relevance. For example, a witness
who is an expert on blood is shown droning on incessantly about 'anti-
serums', 'anti-haemoglobins', 'anti-bodies', 'alpha' and 'beta molecular
chains' while a camera shot of the jury indicates puzzled non-
comprehension. To reinforce this point, and raise the more general problem
of a jury's ability to deal with highly technical evidence, a scene including
law students discussing the Chamberlain case is presented. One puts the
conunonsense view of the problem; 'If highly regarded experts can't agree,
how are the jury supposed to make a conclusion?' On offer here is an
alternative competing discourse about jury competency in specialised areas.
The proposition being advanced is that some legal cases are just too
specialised and too complex for the average person to comprehend and make
a judgement on.
The media too has difficulty breaking down and re-packaging the ma~s
of scientific material offered as evidence. The scientific terminology is
constructed as problematic, with journalists grappling to understand and
explain specialist terms such as 'ouchterlony', 'orthentology' and
'electrophoresis'. While such instances could be read as a critique of
journalistic practices, in the context in which they are employed, the
discursive processes tend toward encouraging an interrogation of science.
Both the verbal and visual discourses constmct science as something
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abstruse and irrelevant. For instance, during the presentation of scientific
evidence, a shot of the media room shows bored journalists yawning openly
as one asks rhetorically: 'Jesus, how many more days ofthis? , Another scene
in a newspaper office has the editor telling another journalist '[' II give you
ten bucks if you can get haptoglobin into a headline!' while another reports
on 'the almost incomprehensible forensic evidence'. This discourse of
science being 'too difficult', and something antithetical to commonsense,
extends to the jury room where members argue about the evidence: 'Can we
sort out the blood thing first before we go any jilrther?' says one. The
response from another jury member reinforces the visual and verbal points
made earlier: 'Forget the blood, none of us understands anything about
that!' .
The media's inability to critically engage with the scientific aspects of tbe
case may appear an innocuous omission but, as Wilson (1991: 4) observes,
both 'media pressure' and 'media st~reotype/prejudice'are involved in many
miscarriage of justice cases, including the Chamberlain case. Pugliese's
(1991: 72-73) print-media textual analysis of the Tim AndersonlHilton
Bombing case argues that the media draw from a range of 'rhetorical and
narrative strategies' in constructing a 'discourse of jownalism', and that in
cases of this type they customarily resort to 'the rhetoric of L'fiminality'. It
seems likely that a media that is unable to evaluate and make distinctions
about the significance and value of scientific evidence, will favour the
standard journalistic discourse: 'We're supposed to be reporting the
prosecution case, right?' is bow one journalist perceived bis role in Evil
Angels ( Bryson 1985: 401).
As has been noted earlier, the coupling of law's adversarial system with
expert evidence often results in outcomes which are far from just. According
to Hogg (1991: 192), the reason for the anomaly lies within the system itself:
'The adversarial process tends to encourage the suppression of evidence
favourable to the accused and the shoring up ( if not manufacture ) of
\
evidence suggestive of guilf. Hogg (1991) further contends that the offering
of 'expert, scientific evidence' in no way assists in arriving at the 'truth'
because this type of evidence is only given to secure a conviction. In fact the
system itself encourages the so-called 'independent expert' to become
incorporated into 'the partisan outlook of one or other of the adversaries'
(Hogg 1991:193). The f1lm acknowledges the problem of partisan evidence
by nominating the Crown's two expert witnesses, Joy Kuhl and Professor
Cameron, and allowing them extra screen time. Their objectivity as
witnesses is seen to be compromised because of their close alignment and
sympathy with the prosecution case. In contrast, none of the defence's expert
witnesses are nominated individually, which allows them greater
impartiality. This however offers them no advantage in the hierarchy of
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discourses, as the lack of nomination signifies their narrative impotence. In
narrative terms this is consistent with the lack of impact their evidence had
on the eventual verdict and fulfills the fIlm's narrative logic and audience
expectations in respect of the rationale needed to secure a conviction.
Evil Angels, as the fictionalised account of the Chamberlain case,
succeeds in exposing the nature and variety of science's discourses within
the legal process. In so doing, it invites interrogation of a particular
encounter between law and science where justice is seen to be a casualty.
According to research by both Bourke (1993) and Wilson (1991) ca~es with
similar outcomes are not uncommon. Some see a remedy in making science
more reliable (Bourke 1993), while others demand more accountability and
scrutiny of science, as in the USA Supreme Court, 1993, Daubert decision.
(Richardson 1994,). The problem also fundamentally concerns the way
knowledge cultures and institutions are constructed and naturalised in
society via a process which valorises and credentials 'science' above other
'naive knowledges' (MeHoul & Grace 1993: 15).
In popular culture's contribution to this debate, the portrayal of science
in Phoenix as an infallible adjunct to law is ultimately regressive in its
determination to preserve and promote a problematic status quo. Texts such
as Evil Angels, by contrast, in acknowledging the contentious nature of the
law/science nexus, allow space for alternative interpretive accounts to fann
and circulate. In offering these oppositional discourses such texts suggest
possibilities for change. In Fiske's (1988: 47) view, social change occurs not
'through revolution' but:
as a result of a constant tension between those with social
power, and subordinate groups trying to gain more power
so as to shift social values towards their own interests. The
textual equivalent of this is the progressive text, where the
discourses of social change are articulated in relationship
with the metadiscourse of the dominant ideology.
(emphasis added)
Clearly a mainstream text such as Evil Angels, with its progressive
potential, represents a window of opportunity through which change may
begin to occur. Professor Chase's (1986: 527) case, that popular culture be
taken seriously in legal matters, stands proved with regard to the contested
area between science and law.
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